Delegation and the regulation of U.S. financial markets

We analyze the institutional determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a general model of the policy-making process in which legislators delegate authority to regulate financial risk at both the firm and systemic levels. The model explains changes in U.S. financial regulation leading up to the financial crisis. We test the predictions of the general model with a novel, comprehensive data set of financial regulatory laws enacted specifically between 1950 and 2009. The theoretical and empirical analysis finds that economic and political factors impact Congress’ decision to delegate regulatory authority to executive agencies, which in turn impacts the stringency of financial market regulation, and our estimation results indicate that political factors may have been stronger and resulted in inefficiencies.     

Foreign investment regulation and firm productivity: Granular evidence from Indonesia

When regulating foreign direct investment (FDI), countries often face a trade-off between pursuing national policy interests and suffering efficiency losses due to FDI restrictions. We demonstrate the presence of this trade-off in the case of a protectionist FDI policy in Indonesia. Using a yearly census of Indonesian manufacturing firms from 2000 to 2015, we link product-level changes in binding FDI regulation due to major regulatory tightening to changes in firm-level productivity. Controlling for an extensive set of fixed effects as well as potential political economy drivers of regulation, we show that a tightening of the regulatory environment was successful in reducing foreign capital reliance among regulated firms, and led to increases in FDI among non-regulated firms producing the same product. Despite compensating increases in domestic capital, regulated firms experienced relative productivity losses. This points towards either a less efficient allocation of domestic capital or a general inferiority of domestic capital as compared to foreign investments.     

Conditional Mandates on Management Earnings Forecasts: The Impact on the Cost of Debt

Exploiting a unique conditional disclosure mandate on management earnings forecasts (MEFs) in China, we examine the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on the cost of debt. We find that firms providing voluntary MEFs have lower cost of debt than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters. The results of the channel analyses reveal that voluntary forecasters have greater commitment to voluntary MEFs in future periods than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters, and the precision, accuracy, and timeliness of MEFs are higher for voluntary forecasters than for mandatory forecasters. Additional analyses show that the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on cost of debt are stronger for voluntary forecasters operating in opaque information environments, issuing high-quality and confirming forecasts, controlled by private shareholders, and operating in highly competitive product markets. Overall, our results indicate that, compared with mandatory MEFs, voluntary MEFs are more informative for credit investors, particularly for firms facing greater information risk and operating uncertainty.     

State‐Led Financial Regulation and Representations of Spatial Fixity: The Example of the Spanish Real Estate Sector

This article offers a bottom‐up contribution to the fixity–motion literature. It aims to unravel the apparent contradiction of real estate spatial fixity in Spain, which is portrayed both as a barrier to accumulation and as a unique source of investment by different capitalist actors. Empirically, it describes the shifts in real estate ownership and changes in profit‐making strategies that have taken place across the real estate sector during the crisis years, and the role of the state in these shifts. The article asserts that the idea of spatial fixity representing a spatial barrier for accumulation does not necessarily apply in the Spanish case. It further claims that the tensions in capital circulation through real estate are not only to be found in the action of time, but in different state strategies pursued by various actors. The opposing representations of fixity are the result of state regulation of interest rates, taxation and risk weighting. The state also increasingly promotes land rents as a source of liquidity creation.     

The effects of anticipated goal‐inconsistent behavior on present goal choices

Prior work has examined how, in the pursuit of long‐term goals, past goal behavior influences present goal choices. Instead, the present work focuses on how anticipating future goal behavior, specifically future goal‐inconsistent behavior, influences present goal choices. For example, how anticipating overspending on an upcoming vacation influences current spending behavior. The authors propose that the effect of anticipated goal‐inconsistent behavior on present goal choice is moderated by the perceived changeability of the future behavior. When future goal‐inconsistent behavior is perceived as changeable, consumers tend to imagine it away, and it has no systematic effect on present goal choices. However, when future goal‐inconsistent behavior is perceived as unchangeable, consumers accept it as a matter of fact, and systematic effects occur. Specifically, some consumers not only fail to buffer against future goal‐inconsistent behavior's negative consequences, but tend to exacerbate those consequences by increasing their goal‐inconsistent behavior in the present. Four studies examine this surprising behavior, using an individual difference (the response‐to‐failure scale) to identify when and for whom it occurs. The studies demonstrate the role of perceived changeability using various manipulations across multiple critical goal domains such as spending, eating, and academics.     

Central bank disclosure as a macroprudential tool for financial stability

The Basel Capital Accord (pillar 3) states that disclosure of information (transparency) is essential to financial stability. This study analyzes, through inflation reports, the disclosure of information from the Central Bank of Brazil concerning the credit market. We consider credit risk and capital buffers as measures of financial stability in this analysis. Furthermore, in order to measure the perception of the monetary authority on the credit market, we built two indices based on the central bank’s communication on credit development. We performed a panel data analysis based on a sample of 125 banks for the period from June 1999 to September 2014 (7000 observations). The findings suggest that central bank communication regarding expectations concerning the credit market contributes to financial stability. Therefore, this kind of communication of central banks (about credit development) may constitute an important macroprudential tool to improve financial stability.     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

异质性环境规制、技术创新与中国工业绿色化

基于中介效应模型和2007~2016年中国省际面板数据，构建异质性环境规制、技术创新与工业绿色化的作用机理理论分析框架，并通过构建异质性环境规制指标体系和工业绿色化指标体系将异质性环境规制与技术创新驱动工业绿色化的作用机理进行实证检验。研究发现：行政型环境规制对工业绿色化起抑制作用，不存在技术创新中介效应；市场型环境规制对工业绿色化的影响存在部分中介效应，可通过技术创新"挤出效应"抑制工业绿色化；公众型环境规制与工业绿色化关系只有中介效应，且公众型环境规制通过技术创新"激励效应"促进工业绿色化；异质性环境规制驱动工业绿色化的技术创新中介效应的研究结论经稳健性检验依然不变。研究认为：在推进异质性环境规制驱动工业绿色化过程中，应充分利用公众型环境规制驱动技术创新"激励效应"，同时应有效规避市场型环境规制驱动技术创新"挤出效应"。     

Monitoring the foreign exchange rate benchmark fix

ABSTRACT

We develop a Manipulation Index (ManIx) that captures the potential manipulation intention of dealers during the World Markets/Reuters (WMR) benchmark (London Close) period at 4 pm London time through a unique algorithm and simulation. The application of this model (using a dataset with dealers’ identities) can identify banks that are prone to potential manipulative behavior. The results concerning the identified banks are validated by the regulatory investigations. Implementation of this algorithm allows regulators better direct their limited resources towards more targeted in-depth investigation.